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Groundings of Voice in Employee Rights 
 
 
“Today on the world’s horizon are seen the forces of political and economic reaction * * * 
fomenting revolution against private capitalism and free enterprise which flourished until thrown 
out of equilibrium.”
1    
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(hereinafter VANDENBURG REPORT). William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The 2001 symposium on Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Accountability, and 
Sustainable Peace (2001 Peace Symposium)
2 explored possible connections between 
corporations and sustainable peace.  In scholarship that resulted from that conference, Fort & 
Schipani argued that, within their workplaces, corporations can model peaceful societies and, 
thereby, increase disputants’ ability to reach accord without resorting to violence.
3  Similarly, 
Dworkin observed that whistle blowing can encourage governance practices that enhance the 
role of the individual in the workplace and that foster communication and conflict resolution 
across diverse groups.
4  In another vein, Fort & Schipani postulated that how a corporation treats 
its stakeholders may influence local culture in ways that either contribute to or undermine 
sustainable peace.
5  Many of the threads from the 2001 Peace Symposium drew upon evidence 
that liberal values and democratic principles appear to play positive roles in avoiding violent 
conflict.
6  In this article, I hypothesize that formal programs enabling employees as owner-
participants in the enterprise for which they work may affect the dynamics that are of interest to 
Professors Fort, Schipani, Dworkin, and other peace scholars.  Most specifically, these programs 
                                                 
2  The symposium was sponsored by The William Davidson Institute at the 
University of Michigan Business School, the Initiative for Social Innovation Through Business 
of the Aspen Institute, and Dr. Erika Parker.  The Vanderbilt Journal of Transactional Law 
Journal printed the papers from the conference as well as remarks by several speakers.  Timothy 
L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, An Overview of the Symposium, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 
379-80  (2002).    
3  Id. at 387. 
4  Terry M. Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNCs, and Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 457, 459 (2002). 
5  Fort & Schipani, supra note 2, at 381-82. 
6  Id. at 381. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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may provide an important foundation for employee voice. 
My past scholarship concentrates on legal frameworks governing employee benefit plan  
issues, including stock ownership and investments.
7  Here, however, my focus is quite different 
from my usual perspective.  Instead of examining how the law affects the relationship between 
corporation and employee in the sponsorship and operation of benefit plans, the question 
becomes how specific types of plans – employee ownership and participation plans – affect the 
employees’ voice within the corporation, the corporation’s interactions with stakeholders, and 
the community’s attitudes toward the corporation.  Advocates of employee ownership and 
participation programs have long argued that those programs can be important in enhancing 
industrial peace.
8  In fact, this article’s opening quotation is not a response to the events of 
September 11, 2001.  Nor does it derive from Saddam Hussein’s alleged interest in developing 
                                                 
7  See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and 
Investment Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?  23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 1 
(2002) (advocating legislation to encourage the provision of plan investment advice); Dana M. 
Muir, The Future of Fiduciary Issues in Employee Benefit Plans, 5 EMP. R. & EMP. POL’Y J. 369 
(2001) (discussing the challenges posed by fiduciary issues); Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as 
an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law,” 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &  EMP. L. 391 
(2000) (arguing for a broad reading of ERISA’s remedial provision); Dana M. Muir, From 
YUPPIES to GUPPIES: Unfunded Mandates and Benefit Plan Regulation,” 34 GA. L. REV. 195 
(1999) (analyzing the nature of benefit plan regulation as unfunded mandates); Dana M. Muir, 
Contemporary Social Policy Analysis and Employee Benefit Programs: Boomers, Benefits, and 
Bargains, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1351 (1997) (considering the policy compromises inherent in 
ERISA); Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Intersection of State Corporation Law and 
Employee Compensation Programs: Is it Curtains for Veil Piercing?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059 
(1996) (examining the implications of veil piercing doctrine for employee benefit plan sponsors); 
Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(1995) (evaluating the import of Supreme Court doctrine for availability of ERISA remedies); 
Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA’s Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L. REV. 201 
(1995) (hereinafter Plant Closings) arguing in favor of a broad reading of ERISA’s prohibition 
on interference with benefit plan entitlements); Dana M. Muir, Note, Changing the Rules of the 
Game: Pension Plan Terminations and Early Retirement Benefits, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1034 (1989) 
(scrutinizing the losses to participants upon plan termination). 
8  See infra text accompanying Part II.A. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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weapons of mass destruction.  Instead, it comes from the 1939 Vandenburg Report, which 
studied profit sharing as a response to World War I and the social injustice produced by the 
Great Depression.
9   
Employee ownership and participation programs, however, do not lack for critics.  A key 
architect of one program stated:  “You can’t confuse ownership and being an employee. At 
home, a shareholder.  At work an employee.”
10  This highlights the contradictory role workers 
can be asked to play when they become involved in these programs.  Economic studies have 
questioned the efficacy of the programs,
11 social scientists have critiqued specific programs,
12 
and employee-owned enterprises are not without problems.
13 
I do not purport in this article to enter into, much less to settle, the extensive debate on 
the pros and cons of employee ownership and participation programs.  Instead, I take the initial 
steps in searching for potential connections between the employee voice enabled by these 
programs, the governance and role of the modern day corporation, and peace.  Through these 
efforts, I hope to suggest a path for future research – research in which a number of disciplines 
may have contributions to make. 
                                                 
9 V ANDENBURG REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-17. 
10 C HARLES S. VARANO, FORCED CHOICES 104 (1999) (quoting Harvey Sperry, 
Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher from the transcript of The Great Weirton Stee(a)l, First Run Features, 
1984, at 105). 
11  See e.g., Charles-Henri D’Arcimoles & Stéphane Trébucq, The Effects of ESOPs 
on Performance and Risk: Evidence from France 3 (2002), at 
http://ocean.st.usm.edu/%7Emklndnst/brussels/TREBUCK.pdf (discussing research on the 
economic effects of ESOPs). 
12 V ARANO, supra note 10. 
13  Perhaps the best known recent example is United Airlines, Inc. (UAL) which is 
majority owned by employees.  For a discussion of employee ownership at UAL, see infra text 
accompanying notes 204-15. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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Various models of employee ownership and participation programs have developed in the 
U.S. and throughout the world.  I begin, in Part II, by exploring selected samples of the historical 
advocacy on behalf of corporate adoption and legislative enablement of programs for employees 
to become owner-participants in the corporations where they work.  Proponents have long held 
the view that ownership and participation programs could help achieve peace within the 
industrial workplace.  The rationales developed during earlier times may inform the present 
inquiry into whether employee ownership and participation may affect corporate governance, 
interact with business ethics, and contribute in some way to peaceful societies.   In order to 
probe, on a conceptual basis, whether programs that establish employees as owner-participants 
might have positive effects on intra-corporation associational dynamics and community 
relationships, I discuss three dimensions of these programs.  Those dimensions are:  governance 
rights, cash flows, and individualism.  In Part III, I very briefly examine a small subset of the 
country-level regulation of employee ownership and participation programs.  In addition to 
specific legislative provisions, I discuss one firm-level example of employee ownership and 
participation. 
I turn, in Part IV, to an initial exploration of the connection among current ownership and 
participation programs, employee voice, corporate governance, business ethics, and sustainable 
peace.  First I inquire whether employee voice derived from ownership and participation might 
have a role in addressing the need for monitoring in modern corporations where ownership and 
management are bifurcated.
14  Second, I consider whether employee involvement through 
                                                 
14  See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Conceptions of the Corporation and the Prospects of 
Sustainable Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 437, 446-451 (2002) (discussing various 
conceptions of the corporation, including the nexus-of-contracts conception); Lee A. Tavis, 
Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 487, 528-532 
(2002) (same). William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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ownership and participation may have any implications for the ability of corporations to model 
democratic principles.  Finally, I end by asking whether enabling employees as owner-
participants could provide any opportunities for reducing the “sources of conflict,”
15 which Fort 
and Schipani identified in their peace scholarship.   
 
II. History and Dimensions of Employee Ownership and Participation Programs 
 
In this Part, I begin by examining some of the views of employee ownership and 
participation programs that developed during earlier times.  The periods following each of the 
World Wars and during the depression of the 1930s are particularly interesting.  Policy makers 
of those times recognized the challenges inherent in achieving peace and maintaining democracy 
in the face of severe social and economic pressures.   
Next I explore fundamental factors underlying employee ownership and participation 
programs.  By unpacking those programs, it becomes possible to consider the connections among 
formalized programs that are superficially quite different.  The examination of the constituent 
elements also makes transparent the role of entry and exit rights in affecting the scope of 
employee voice developed through ownership and participation programs. 
 
A.  Anti-war and Harmony as Motivating Ideals 
 
This is far from the first time the connections between employee ownership and 
                                                 
15  Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporation in Fostering 
Sustainable Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 416 (2002). William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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participation and sustainable peace have been examined.  In fact, there is a long history of 
connecting employer-sponsored financial participation schemes with democratic principles and 
workplace harmony.  In 1794 a glass works in Pennsylvania established the first recorded profit 
sharing plan in the U.S. so that, in the words of the owner: “‘the democratic principle upon 
which this nation was founded should not be restricted to the political processes but should be 
applied to the industrial operations as well.’”
16  That plan founder, Albert Gallatin, was neither 
financially nor politically naive.  In fact, he later served as Secretary of the Treasury under both 
Presidents Madison and Jefferson.
17 
In the early 1900s, U.S. businesses increased their use of profit sharing and stock 
ownership plans.  That ended with the stock market crash of 1929 and ensuing depression.
18  In 
the wake of the violence of World War I and the bursting of the stock market bubble that had 
developed in the 1920s, a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate held hearings in 1938 on profit-
sharing.
19  The resulting report, named the Vandenburg Report after the subcommittee’s chair, 
Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg, includes discussion of the “mass discontent” then existing in the 
U.S.,
20 the philosophy of profit sharing,”
21 and the views of employers and employees on profit 
sharing.
22  The Vandenburg Report summarizes the group’s conclusions by stating: 
                                                 
16 P ROFIT SHARING MANUAL 16-17 (Joseph B. Meier ed. 1957) (quoting Albert 
Gallatin). 
17  Id. at 16. 
18  Id. at 18. 
19 V ANDENBURG REPORT, supra note 1, at 19. 
20  Id.  
21  Id. at 58-68. 
22  Id. at 101-26. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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The committee finds that profit sharing, in one form or another, has been and can 
be eminently successful, when properly established, in creating employer-
employee relations that make for peace, equity, efficiency and contentment.  We 
believe it to be essential to the ultimate maintenance of the capitalist system.”
23 
 
In one of the most interesting historical intersections between financial participation and 
sustainable peace, the Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America traces its founding to a Rotary 
Club meeting in Orrville, Ohio in 1947.  The speaker that day was Robert Hartman, a Professor 
of Philosophy at Wooster College.  Professor Hartman told the gathering that profit sharing 
“might prevent a recurrence of the ‘hate and strife’ that had engulfed the world in war.”
24 
Professor Hartman’s perspective was most likely affected by his childhood in Germany 
in the 1910s,
25 seeing his father go off to war,
26 escaping Nazi Germany in 1933,
27 and believing 
himself to be under surveillance by the Nazis for a number of years even after he left Germany.
28 
 Although Professor Hartman did not remain active for long in the predecessor to the Profit 
Sharing/401(k) Council,
29 his interest in peace continued throughout his lifetime.  In 1973 he 
was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.
30 
                                                 
23  Id. at 5. 
24 V IRGINIA DAWSON, MAKING CAPITALISM DEMOCRATIC: THE CREATION OF THE 
COUNCIL OF PROFIT SHARING INDUSTRIES, 1947 2 (undated pamphlet distributed by the Profit 
Sharing/401(k) Council of America; copy on file with the author). 
25 R OBERT S. HARTMAN, FREEDOM TO LIVE, THE ROBERT HARTMAN STORY (Arthur 
R. Ellis ed. 1994). 
26  Id. at 10-11. 
27  Id. at 34. 
28  Id. at 38. 
29 D AWSON, supra note 24, at 8. 
30 H ARTMAN, supra note 25, at 194. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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The belief that employee ownership and participation might lead to sustainable peace or 
at least increased social justice and harmony was not limited to the United States during these 
periods.  General de Gaulle began advocating profit sharing in France during the 1940s as “a 
‘third way’ between capitalism and socialism, towards social harmony and labor-management 
cooperation.”
31  More broadly, the use of works councils, which involve nonfinancial 
participation, throughout Western Europe developed in the post-war period in response to the 
“need for mechanisms of representation, social peace, and labor-management cooperation in the 
rebuilding of post war economies.”
32 
 
B.  Participation Dimensions of Employee Ownership 
 
Employee ownership can be unpacked along three dimensions that may affect employee 
voice.  Because of the nature of employee ownership each of these dimensions may exist along a 
continuum.  The two obvious facets of corporate ownership to affect voice are the rights owners 
receive to participate in the governance of the enterprise and to share in the financial success of 
the enterprise.
33  A third dimension becomes important in the context of various programs that 
enable employee ownership, and, thus, voice, in the enterprises where they work.  Unlike the 
                                                 
31 Daniel  Vaughan-Whitehead,  France: The Driving Force of Comprehensive 
Legislation, in WORKERS’ FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION: EAST-WEST EXPERIENCES, at 55 (Daniel 
Vaughan-Whitehead et al. eds., 1995). 
32 Lowell  Turner,  International and Comparative: Works Councils: Consultation, 
Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations, 50 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 707, 707 
(1997). 
33  Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The 
Case of United and the Airline Industry, in EMPLOYEES & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 317, 318 
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark Roe eds. 1999). William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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landscape of many stockholder situations, those programs may limit or negate the right of 
employees to make an individual decision about “buying” or “selling” shares.  I will refer to this 
dimension as one involving entry or exit rights. 
 
1.  Ownership and Governance Rights 
 
Ownership in a corporate enterprise typically brings with it rights to exercise certain 
specified governance prerogatives.  In the U.S. approach, for example, equity shareholders tend 
to have rights to elect members of the board of directors.  It is through those types of governance 
rights that shareholders are most directly able to monitor corporate management. 
In employee ownership programs, employees may derive similar or equivalent 
governance rights from formal share ownership.  Other avenues to participation in corporate 
governance, however, may be available to employees.  Some companies, for example, have 
established quality circle programs
34 or other formal mechanisms to involve employees in 
workplace decision-making.  The participatory programs that are not based in equity ownership 
tend to be circumscribed in the scope of decisional authority, and, thus, the voice, they accord to 
employees.  A manufacturing employee, for example, may have input over the types of tools 
used to perform jobs in her area.  When compared to a right to vote for corporate directors or 
against an extraordinary corporate transaction, the rights established in workplace participation 
programs may appear puny.  On the other hand, such programs provide employees an avenue to 
contribute their specialized knowledge.  These programs may allow for much more frequent 
                                                 
34  For a discussion of the operation of and the legal challenges to quality circles, 
see Mark Fox & Fred Naffziger, From Illegal to Legal – Quality Circles Come Full Circle, 35 
BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 1 (2002). William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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participation opportunities than the generally episodic voting rights that inhere in share 
ownership.  In optimal situations, employees may be able to see the connection between their 
participation and the results more quickly and directly than in traditional shareholder votes. 
In contrast to workplace programs that open participation to nonstockholders, some 
employee stock ownership programs limit employee governance rights.  For example, the 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) at Weirton Steel
35 stripped employees of many voting 
rights associated with stock held by the ESOP for the first five years of the ESOP’s existence.
36  
In a similar vein, the ownership power of the employee cohort may be affected by factors such as 
the proportion of employee ownership and the cohesiveness of the employee population. 
In sum, in considering the connections among employee participation in corporate 
governance, business ethics, and sustainable peace, it is useful to recognize that employee 
ownership provides one basis for participation in governance.  But, depending upon the 
configuration of ownership programs, the strength of employee voice supported by any given 
program, and, thus, employee governance rights, may vary tremendously.  And, depending upon 
what types of governance rights are of value, it is possible that those rights may be acquired 
without employee share ownership. 
 
2.  Ownership and Financial Participation Rights 
 
Employee financial participation is another factor of ownership that may occur across a 
                                                 
35  For a more extensive discussion of this ESOP, see infra text accompanying Part 
III.C. 
36 V ARANO, supra note 10, at 138-39. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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spectrum.  Corporate owners typically participate in the financial success of the enterprise 
through receipt of dividend distributions and any increase in share value.  If employees acquire 
corporation stock, there is a sense in which the employees participate financially on a 
proportional basis with other owners.  Financial participation may bring with it incentives for 
employees to exercise voice on important corporate decisions.  
Conversely, employer-sponsored benefit programs can enable employees to participate 
financially in the success of the corporation without the employees becoming actual 
stockholders.  Phantom stock programs can replicate the financial benefits of share ownership 
without providing any governance rights.  Or, profit sharing programs can be established 
according to formulae that attempt to track the company results experienced by the equity 
shareholders, that recognize the achievements of a particular division or other work group, or 
even that reward individual accomplishment.   
 
3.  Ownership and Entry and Exit Rights 
 
The third dimension of employee ownership that may have implications for the present 
inquiry is entry and exit rights.  As I explained earlier, by this I mean the ability of an individual 
employee to decide whether or not to acquire corporation stock (entry rights) and the ability of 
an individual employee to sell corporation securities and receive the sale value in current cash 
(exit rights).  Consider an employee ownership program that distributes equities to the employee 
population without giving employees the choice to receive cash or other compensation in lieu of 
the securities.  The employees do have entry rights in the sense that they automatically 
participate in the distribution.  However, an employee who has no interest in ownership, perhaps William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
  14
because current consumption needs negate any voluntary trade-off between current and deferred 
compensation, has no right to make an individual determination on entry.   The lack of an entry 
right may affect the value the employee places upon the shares received in an involuntary 
acquisition.  The involuntary nature of the transaction also may affect the employee’s views 
toward voice, governance, and participation rights. 
Employee share ownership programs also may deny employees exit rights.  Depending 
upon the nature of the share ownership plan, employees may have limited access to dividends 
and increased share value.  For example, if a young employee owns employer stock held by an 
ESOP and the ESOP precludes distributions prior to retirement or termination of employment, 
then, unlike the typical public stockholder, the employee does not have access to consume the 
increased value of the shares or dividends that are allocated to the ESOP account.  That 
employee may perceive the value of the shares to be quite low given the inaccessibility of the 
shares and the dividends.  In such a situation, even if employees can see that their actions, such 
as productivity improvements, governance enhancements, and hourly wage sacrifices, lead to 
increased dividends and share value, the lack of access to those financial gains may affect the 
employees’ willingness to work harder or smarter or to accept more financial risk.   
The broader point is that the lack of entry and exit rights for employees who become 
corporation shareholders may have implications for the internal corporate dynamics that the 
peace scholars have identified as being important.  On the other hand, the lack of entry or exit 
rights may be a critical component of an employee share ownership program because of 
regulatory requirements, corporate financing concerns, or the nature of a privatization program.  
And, restrictions on exit rights may be necessary in order to ensure long-term or substantial 
employee ownership if either of those factors is an integral part of the program. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
  15
In sum, unpacking the components of employee ownership programs increases the 
transparency of the participation elements of those programs.  Formal share ownership may 
enable employees to take part in corporate governance and partake financially in the success or 
failure of the enterprise.  But, given the existing and ongoing nature of the typical employee-
employer relationship, employees can enjoy both governance rights and financial participation 
without owning employer securities.  For this reason, I use the term ownership and participation 
in this article to cover the full range of such programs.  Regardless of whether ownership and 
participation intersect, the existence of entry and exit rights to ownership programs may affect 
the corporate dynamics that connect with sustainable peace.   
In this article, I do not delve deeply into the economics, organizational behavior, and 
other literature that attempts to evaluate the quantifiable effects of employee ownership and 
participation programs.  There has been a significant amount of that type of research on a world-
wide basis, much of it with contradictory or incomplete results.  One of the few points on which 
researchers appear largely to agree is that combining share ownership with decision-making 
participation is more likely to be effective than utilizing either share ownership or decision-
making participation alone.
37  While the measurable effects of these programs on firm 
performance, employee attitudes, and community is certainly relevant to the question of 
sustainable peace, it is not my purpose in this article to summarize or evaluate this extensive 
body of literature.  Instead, I am examining the potential conceptual connections between 
ownership and participation programs and the factors others have identified as being of 
importance in whether corporations can contribute to sustainable peace.     
 
                                                 
37  D’Arcimoles & Trébucq, supra note 11, at 3.  William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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  III.  Enabling Legislation and International Perspectives  
 
In this Part, I consider various models of employee ownership and participation programs 
as they currently exist.  For this initial effort, I focus primarily on the United States, but I also 
sample a variety of programs from throughout the world.  In this Part, I view programs largely 
through the lens of enabling legislation.  This focus provides the foundation to enable cross-
border comparisons and establishes categorizations in a way that may be more neutral than if I 
considered the programs from the vantage point of a group directly affected by the programs, 
such as management, labor, or founding shareholders. 
Approaching the models of employee ownership and participation programs through the 
context of enabling legislation does have some implications for my analysis.  First, I am not 
considering in any detail in this article the many types of informal programs that corporations 
utilize to encourage employees to own corporation stock.  Nor will I address informal profit 
sharing payments.   Those exclusions eliminate vast numbers of situations that result in 
opportunities, or mandates, for employees to own company stock.  Similarly, the exclusions 
ignore meaningful numbers of profit sharing payments, some of which may be of significant 
monetary amounts,
38 may be institutionalized through union an other types of contractual 
agreements,
39 and may represent widespread industry practice.
40 
                                                 
38  See e.g., Daniel Eisenberg, Where People Are Never Let Go; Lincoln Electric, 
TIME, June 18, 2001, at 40 (citing an average bonus of $17,579 in 2000, or about 45 % of 
salary). 
39  See e.g., John Gallagher, A Quick Look at the Tentative Northwest Agreement, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 11, 1998 (reporting on profitsharing in the new Northwest contract 
with pilots); Susan E. Peterson, Ford Profit-Sharing Keeps on Truckin’, STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 5, 
1998, at 1D (reporting profit-sharing payments of $4,400 per union worker at Ford Motor Co., 
$750 at General Motors, and $4,600 at Chrysler). William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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A.  United States 
 
Federal legislation in the United States encourages employee ownership through a variety 
of tax-deferred and nondeferred vehicles.
41  In this section I outline, for the nontechnical reader, 
broad categories of regulation and very briefly summarize the major vehicles for employee 
ownership. 
 
1. ESOPs   
 
ESOPs are sponsored at the firm level.
42  Legislation provides significant tax incentives 
for those plans.
43  By statute, ESOPs must exist primarily to hold employer securities,
44 so they 
are a particularly strong example of a type of plan where employee ownership is inherent in the 
plan model and the enabling legislation.  In an ESOP, each individual employee has a plan 
account and the account typically is credited for each year of work with an allocation of 
                                                                                                                                                             
40 Craig  Woker,  Tying Pay to Success at Minimills, NEW STEEL, Dec. 1, 1998, at 66 
(reporting on discretionary compensation, including profit sharing, in minimills). 
41  See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) §§ 1-4402, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1001-1461 (1994) (setting forth the basic federal regulation of pension and welfare benefit 
plans). 
42  See MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS 136 (student edition 
1999). 
43  Id. at 160-176. 
44  Id. at 136. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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employer stock.
45  Stock allocations frequently are made based upon the employee’s 
proportional share of salary as compared to the rest of the employee population participating in 
the ESOP.
46  In order for the tax advantages to be available, the ESOP must not unduly 
discriminate in favor of highly paid employees when determining plan membership and benefit 
entitlements.
47 
Companies in financial distress sometimes use ESOPs as part of a company restructuring 
program.  In those situations employees may trade-off current wages and benefits for ownership 
rights through the ESOP.  This occurred at Weirton Steel, which is discussed more extensively 
below,
48 and, more recently, at United Airlines when the pilots and mechanics agreed to an 
ESOP.
49  Some companies have used ESOPs as mechanisms to discourage or avoid hostile 
takeovers.
50  Other companies adopt ESOPs for a variety of business reasons.
51 
                                                 
45  Id. at 131. 
46  See id. at 118 (discussing prevalent allocation formula for profit sharing plans). 
47  Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 TAX L. REV. 363, 396 (1990); 
Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation Positively 
Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227 (1999). 
48  Infra text accompanying Part III.C. 
49 Gordon,  supra note 33, at 338-53. 
50  See, e.g., Herman v. NationsBankTrust Co., 126 F.3d 1354 (11
th Cir. 1997) 
(regarding voting issues in the Polaroid ESOP in response to a hostile tender offer); Steven J. 
Arsenault, Fiduciary Duties of ESOP Trustees Under ERISA in Tender Offers: The Impact of 
Herman v. NationsBank Trust Company and a Proposal for Reform, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
87 (2000) (discussing the issue of ESOP voting rights in tender offers). 
51  Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1155 (1988) (“The ESOP is best understood as 
a tool of corporate finance); Brett McDonnell, ESOP’s Failures: Fiduciary Duties when 
Managers of Employee-Owned Companies Vote to Entrench Themselves, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. 
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The highly regulated nature of ESOPs has significant implications for employee exit and 
entrance rights.  The fact that large percentages of the lower compensated employees at an 
entity, or entire bargaining units at a unionized employer, must participate in the ESOP in order 
for the plan to receive tax advantages means that plans cannot be structured to give significant 
entrance and exit rights to those employees.  Exit rights are further limited by the deferred nature 
of the plans.  By statute, distribution of employer stock out of the plan typically cannot occur 
until the plan is terminated, or an individual employee retires or otherwise leaves the company.  
 
2.  Stock Purchase Plans 
 
U.S. tax law also supports employee share ownership by permitting employers to sponsor 
employee stock purchase plans.
52  To encourage employees to participate in stock purchase 
plans, employers may discount the purchase price up to fifteen percent from the fair market 
value of the stock at the time of purchase.
53  Participation in the plan must be open to all 
employees with the exception of part time employees, those employed for less than two years, 
and highly paid employees.
54  The effect is to create stock purchase plans that are available to all 
‘regular’ employees.  Like ESOPs, stock purchase plans are targeted very specifically to support 
employee ownership of employer stock. 
Stock purchase plans are permitted to provide employees with greater exit and entrance 
                                                 
52  William Dunn & Julie C. Rumberger, Equity-based Compensation Plans for 
Multinationals: Compensation in a Worldwide Environment, 48 TAX EXEC. 373 (1996). 
53  Alden J. Bianchi, Managing the Contingent Workforce After the Microsoft and 
Time Warner Cases, THE CORPORATE COUNSELOR, Aug. 2000, at 1. 
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rights than ESOPs may offer.  Although all regular employees must have the option to 
participate in the plan, the law does not require plans to force employees to purchase stock 
through these plans. Thus entrance rights are unrestricted by statute.  Exit rights are restricted 
only to a limited extent.
55 
 
3.  Stock Option Plans    
 
Compared to the other plans enumerated so far, stock option plans are subject to the least 
federal regulation.  They are completely exempt from Titles I and IV of ERISA.
56  The Tax Code 
governs the granting corporation’s ability to deduct option expenses as well as the timing and 
treatment of income for the option recipient.
57  But, the Tax Code does not mandate plan choices 
in these respects.  Instead, it specifies the tax treatment of whatever program an employer 
establishes.
58  Even federal securities laws provide a simplified process for registering option 
shares.  Therefore, while the scope of the tax incentives accorded to option plans varies 
depending upon the terms established by the plan sponsor, the relevant laws permit employers to 
exercise great flexibility in establishing these plans.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Future Trends, 52 TENN. L. REV. 167, 188 (1985). 
55  Dunn & Rumberger, supra note 52 (noting that stock purchase plans are subject 
to “stock holding periods”). 
56  See Subcommittee on Executive Compensation of the Committee on Employee 
Benefits and Executive Compensation, Executive Compensation: A 1987 Road Map for the 
Corporate Advisor, 43 BUS. LAW. 187, 292 (1987) (noting that ERISA’s vesting provisions do 
not apply to stock option plans.). 
57  David E. Kahen & Cheryl F. Fisher, Incentive Stock Options Revisited, 49 TAX 
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Unlike tax-favored stock purchase plans and ESOPs, tax-favored stock option plans in 
the U.S. may be made available only to a select group of employees.  While it is not unusual for 
the options to vest over a period of years, typically there are few limits on exit rights.   The 
relatively low level of regulation of many stock option grants means that individual employees 
may have substantial entry rights.  Particularly upon hire, a top level executive may be able to 
bargain for higher or lower levels of stock option compensation as compared to other forms of 
compensation, depending upon the executive’s preferences. 
 
4.  Deferred Compensation Pension Plans 
 
This category covers a variety of tax-favored plans intended to provide deferred benefits 
to employees.
59  U.S. law typically categorizes these plans as DC or DB plans.
60  In DC plans, 
the investment risk incides upon the employees.  By definition, those plans establish individual 
accounts for employees.
61  Depending upon the terms of the plan, an individual employee may 
choose to invest her plan assets in employer stock,
62 but even if the employee makes the 
investment decision and employer stock is an available alternative, there is no special tax 
                                                 
59 C ANAN, supra note 42, at 19 (discussing qualified retirement plans). 
60  Plant Closings, supra note 7, at 205. 
61  Id. 
62  By delegating investment selection to employees in compliance with specific 
standards, employers can avoid fiduciary liability in the choice of specific investments.  CANAN, 
supra note 42, at 823-31.  Employers determine the investment vehicles available to employees 
in those participant directed plans.  Id.  Many employers offer employer stock as one of the 
investment options.  Jack VanDerhei, Company Stock in 401(k) Plans: Results of a Survey of 
ISCEBS Members, 4 (2002), at http://www.ebri.org/pdfs/iscebs.pdf (reporting on a survey 
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incentive to encourage the purchase of employer stock rather than any other available investment 
vehicle.  In plans that provide for employee elective salary deferrals and employer matching 
contributions, frequently known as 401(k) plans, the employer may require that the matching 
contributions be held in employer stock.
63  But, again, there are no regulatory provisions that 
encourage investment in employer stock rather than other alternatives. 
In DB plans, all of the investment risk incides upon the sponsoring employer.
64  These 
plans cannot hold more than 10% of their assets in employer stock
65 so there is a sense in which 
the decision-maker’s entrance rights are severely limited.  For purposes of this article, however, 
the effects of stock ownership do not affect the relevant characteristics of ownership.  First, the 
benefit plan trustee or investment manager is responsible for voting the shares and exercising 
any other governance rights.
66  Second, because the investment risk of the plan incides upon the 
sponsoring employer, any investment gains or losses accrue to that employer, and not to 
employees.
67  Thus, employees do not have any individual or collective governance rights based 
upon the DB plan’s ownership of employer securities.   
 
                                                 
63  This is one of the requirements imposed by Enron that generated a great deal of 
controversy.  Evan Miller & Alison Cera, Learning the True Meaning of Fiduciary, the Hard 
Way, NATIONAL L. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at B8. 
64  Plant Closings, supra note 7, at 205-06. 
65  See CANAN, supra note 42, at 136 (listing the types of plans to which the 10% 
limitation does not apply). 
66  Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention: Meeting the 
Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund Through Relationship Investing, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 
414, 449 (1995); A.A. Sommer, Jr., Defining the Corporate Constituency: Corporate 
Governance in the Nineties: Mangers vs. Institutions, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 363-64 (1990). 
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5. Miscellaneous  Programs 
 
Employers in the U.S. utilize a wide array of other compensation programs that may 
broadly fall into the rubric of employee participation plans.
68  I have already referred to quality 
circles and like programs that encourage employee involvement in workplace decision-making.  
From the financial participation perspective, corporations use numerous mechanisms.  These 
range from the substantial lump sum profit sharing payments made by some automotive 
manufacturers in the late 1990s
69 to the pink Cadillacs awarded to top sales people of the Mary 
Kay cosmetic company.
70  These types of programs do not tend to be governed by specialized 
provisions of U.S. benefits or securities law and do not receive any special tax deferrals or other 
incentives.  Because of the paucity of legislation and the difficulty in identifying and cataloguing 
these programs, they receive little coverage in this article. 
 
 
B.  Sampling non-United States Legislation 
 
 
Legislation enabling employee ownership and participation is widely divergent and 
                                                 
68  For discussions of employee participation plans and their relationship with 
unionized representation, see Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New 
Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1651 (1999); Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee Participation / Representation Gap: An 
Assessment and Proposed Solution, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. LAW 491 (2001); David W. 
Orlandini, Comment, Employee Participation Programs:  How to Make them Work Today and in 
the Twenty-First Century, 24 CAP. U.L. REV. 597 (1995). 
69 Peterson,  supra note 39, at 1D (reporting profit-sharing payments of $4,400 per 
union worker at Ford Motor Co., $750 at General Motors, and $4,600 at Chrysler). 
70  Ieva M. Augstums, Mary Kay Convention Opens, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
July 18, 2002 (reporting Mary Kay’s incentives include pink Cadillacs as well as other vehicles); 
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reasonably prevalent across the world.  Experts cite Jamaica as having one of the world’s most 
progressive ESOP frameworks.
71  Through what is widely known as the European Works 
Council Directive, the European Union requires many companies, particularly multinationals, to 
establish either a procedure or a European Works Council to engage in consultation with and 
provide information to employees.
72  In Poland, employee ownership has been used in the 
process of privatizing formerly state-owned enterprises.
73   
This sampling barely indicates the variation in the methods and scale of employee 
ownership and participation programs world-wide.  It is beyond the scope of this article to even 
begin to survey the array of legislation across the globe.  Instead, I will concentrate briefly on 
France, Egypt, and Russia.  I selected France as a Western European contrast to the United 
States.  Russia presents an interesting case not only because it utilized employee ownership in its 
privatization process, but also because of its political and economic history.  Finally, I choose to 
discuss Egypt because it is a counterpoint to Russia in that Egypt also established employee 
ownership legislation as part of its privatization program and because it is culturally distinct 
from the other countries discussed.  
 
1. France 
                                                                                                                                                             
(reporting Mary Kay is not offering pink Cadillacs as incentives in Moscow). 
71  Ryan Weeden & Corey Rosen, Employee Ownership in a Global Context, in 
National Center for Employee Ownership, Employee Ownership Legislation Around the World 
3, 7 (2002), at http://www.nceoglobal.org/articles/aroundtheworld.html. 
72  Janice R. Bellace, The European Works Council Directive: Transnational 
Information and consultation in the European Union, 18 COMP. LAB. L. 325, 350 (1997). 
73  National Center for Employee Ownership, Employee Ownership Legislation 
Around the World 68 (2002), at http://www.nceoglobal.org/articles/aroundtheworld.html 
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In the mid-1980s France consolidated legislation enabling and providing tax advantages 
to company programs for employee share ownership, compulsory deferred profit-sharing plans, 
and voluntary cash profit sharing arrangements.
74  The legislation also encourages employee 
representation on company boards when employees own at least five per cent of the company’s 
equity shares.
75  Approximately 2,000, or less than ten per cent of the total firms with some type 
of financial participation program, sponsor savings or employee ownership plans that invest 
exclusively or primarily in company stock.   In comparison, in 1997 approximately 15,500 
deferred profit sharing agreements covered some 4.8 million employees and provided about 3.8 
per cent of those employees’ wages.
76  
Employee share ownership plans in France are similar to U.S.-style 401(k) plans in that 
they may permit voluntary contributions by employees with employer matching contributions.  
The plans also are similar to U.S. stock purchase plans because, to encourage employee 
participation, employers may discount the purchase price of company stock.
77  The voluntary 
nature of these plans provides some entry rights albeit with financial incentives attributable to 
any employer match and discounted stock purchase price.   
Privatization in the mid-1980s and again in the early 1990s utilized share ownership 
plans.  In the 1980's, however, employee purchases at most companies did not reach the ten per 
cent of stock set aside for the employee population.  Employees showed more enthusiasm in the 
                                                 
74 Vaughan-Whitehead,  supra note 31, at 59-60. 
75  Id. at 61-62. 
76  NCEO Report, supra note 73, at 34-38. 
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1990s, but there have been criticisms that ownership did not sufficiently increase employees’ 
decision-making participation.
78 
In addition to employee contributions and privatization, share ownership plans also may 
be funded through either deferred or cash profit sharing payments.  In order to access the tax 
advantages, however, the amounts contributed to a share ownership plan must be inaccessible for 
at least five years.
79  This restriction means that the plans significantly limit employee exit. 
A significant difference between France and the U.S. is that French law requires all 
companies with at least fifty employees to sponsor a deferred profit sharing plan.  Each plan 
must include all employees with at least six months of service.  The law contains tax incentives 
to encourage companies to provide more than the statutory minimum profit sharing formula.  On 
the other hand, statutory maximums limit the amount of the profit-sharing payment that can be 
made to the most highly-paid employees.  The compulsory nature of these plans means that 
workers have no flexibility on entry rights, other than perhaps to bargain for more than the 
minimum payment.  The legislation blocks employee access to the funds for between three and 
five years, thus limiting exit rights.
80 
 
2. Egypt 
 
Egypt’s development of legislation enabling employee ownership dates only to 1992.  
Egypt made employee access to share purchases a mandated feature of privatization, requiring at 
                                                 
78  Id. at 68. 
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least ten per cent of shares to be made available to employees.  The trust-like entities established 
to purchase and hold employer stock in these programs are Employer Stockholder Associations 
(ESAs).  In addition to the mandatory set-aside, however, the legislation permits companies to 
adopt the equivalent of a U.S.-style ESOP to add higher levels of employee ownership.
81  
Majority ownership tends to result at companies that are too weak to attract external 
buyers.
82  Because of financing difficulties, which are discussed below,
83 there appear to be few 
active ESAs in Egypt.  Only eighty-six existed in late 1996, approximately one-third of which 
owned the majority of the company’s stock.
84 
It appears that membership in an ESA
85 is open to all employees at the company.  
Depending upon the approach used to finance share purchases, however, employee participation 
might be optional.  The ESA’s share purchases may be funded through a loan arrangement, 
company funding, or employee contributions.  Because newly privatized companies typically are 
unable to fund these share purchases and ESAs have had difficulty in obtaining outside loans, 
employee funds frequently are used.  This typically entails the use of existing employee pension 
funds or ongoing employee contributions.  Investment of employee pension funds in a company 
too weak to attract external investment or an ESA loan increases the employees’ financial risk.  
If the company fails, the employees are left with worthless shares, no jobs, and a defunct pension 
                                                 
81  Id. at 25. 
82  Id. at 30. 
83  See infra text accompanying note 86.  
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fund.
86  On the other hand, purchases funded through ongoing employee contributions may not 
attract substantial amounts of employee investment.  The extent of entry rights in these programs 
obviously varies and depends upon the type of financing used by the ESA. 
An individual’s participation in an ESA ends at the termination of employment.  There 
also is an indication that employees may voluntarily withdrawal their plan assets at an earlier 
date.
87  The scope of exit rights depends upon the nature of any legal or practical restrictions on 
early withdrawal. 
Employees receive governance rights in the ESA, but no direct governance rights in the 
company.  Employees who participate in the ESA form a general assembly that elects the ESA’s 
Board of Directors.  The Board manages the ESA and votes the ESA’s shares in matters that go 
to the company’s shareholders for vote.  The ESA cannot sell shares to anyone who is not an 
employee or former employee without approval of the majority of ESA participants.
88  This 
would seem to be a potential deterrent to a hostile acquisition and, thus, may serve to entrench 
management. 
 
3. Russia 
 
Between 1992 and 1994
89 Russia’s privatization program resulted in high levels of 
                                                 
86  NCEO Report, supra note 73, at 27-28. 
87  Id. at 26. 
88  Id. at 26-29. 
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privitizaitons and resulted in significant employee ownership. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
  29
employee ownership at privatized firms.
90  Legislation provided employees with the choice of 
three alternative mechanisms for privatization, involving different levels of employee ownership 
and variations in the use of cash or vouchers to purchase enterprise shares.
91  Most employee 
groups chose the second option, which permitted workers to purchase fifty-one per cent of the 
enterprise.
92   
It appears that workers obtained majority ownership in approximately two-thirds of the 
firms privatized during this period.   That included, however, a substantial number of shares – 
estimated at 8.6 per cent – held by top managers.
93  The availability of alternative privatization 
schemes permitted some collective entry decision making rights. 
Privatization and employee ownership in Russia presented some unique challenges.  
While familiar with collective ownership, the Russian population may have been the only 
population of the Central and European countries that had no first-hand experience with a 
market-based economy.
94  One commentator has noted that Russians have not had a history of 
the individualistic, entrepreneurial business culture found in the West.
95  Furthermore, managers 
reportedly have encouraged employees to transfer their proxy rights to management.  Even when 
                                                 
90 Bogdan  Lissovolik,  Rapid Spread of Employee Ownership in the Privatized 
Russia, in PRIVATIZATION SURPRISES IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 204, 219 (Milica Uvalic & 
Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, eds., 1997). 
91 J OSEPH R. BLASI ET AL., KREMLIN CAPITALISM: PRIVATIZING THE RUSSIAN 
ECONOMY 41 (1997); Lissovolik, supra note 90, at 217; NCEO Report, supra note 73, at 70-71. 
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93 Lissovolik,  supra note 90, at 220; see also BLASI ET AL., supra note 91, at 193 t.4 
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these transfers have not been made, employees have faced potential voting pressure because 
voting was not confidential.
96  
Finally, the level of corruption in Russia may cause Russia to be a particularly interesting 
context to think about the relationship between employee ownership and participation and 
sustainable peace.  Fort and Schipani observe that high levels of corruption may lead to conflict 
and that corruption, thus, is a negative factor for sustainable peace.
97  Commentators have 
observed low levels of honesty in the Russian economy during the nineteenth century, the post-
revolutionary period, and in the recent post-privatization period.
98  Over the longer term it may 
be productive to determine whether employee ownership affects a firm’s willingness to engage 
in corrupt practices.  If so, Fort and Schipani’s observations imply a resulting effect on the level 
of violence. 
In sum, legislative frameworks supporting employee ownership and participation are not 
rare in countries around the world.  This brief survey barely touched upon the existence and 
scope of the legislative approaches.  It is clear, though, that both Western, industrialized 
countries and emerging economies often use some form of employee ownership or participation. 
 Even small countries with very limited industrialization, such as Jamaica
99 and Trinidad and 
Tobago
100 have enacted legislation enabling employee ownership or participation. 
Although researchers are still seeking answers to the economic efficiency of these 
                                                 
96 B LASI ET AL., supra note 91, at 106-07. 
97  Fort & Schipani, supra note 15, at 394-99. 
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programs,
101 the question for this article is the conceptual one of whether the employee 
ownership and participation programs established under these legislative frameworks might have 
connections with corporate governance, business ethics, and sustainable peace. In the next Part, I 
turn to the conceptual discussion of these possible connections.  First, however, I provide one 
example of employee ownership at the firm level.     
 
 
C.  One Company’s Experience 
 
 
Consider a company with a long history of paternalism both internally and in its 
community.  Company workers received wages in excess of the typical industry wages.
102  The 
company and government joined forces to provide social services such as a hospital, community 
center,
103 and public library.
104  The existence of basic infrastructure support such as gas, water, 
and electricity was inextricably linked with the company.
105 
Eventually, though, the political, cultural, and economic frameworks changed.  Product 
markets changed.
106  Plants and equipment became obsolete because of lack of investment or 
poor construction and maintenance.
107  The paternalistic system of employment, social services, 
and government foundered in the face of economic pressures.  External cultural and business 
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frameworks rendered the old ways obsolete.
108  Eventually ownership of the enterprise was 
transferred to the employees.
109 
  Numerous companies in countries through the world have turned to employee 
ownership in times of transition.
110   It occurred during the 1990s in Russia and some of the 
Central and Eastern European countries.
111  It occurred somewhat in France in the mid-1980s 
and the mid-1990s.
112  It occurred to a limited extent in Egypt in the 1990s.  The foregoing 
example, however, describes the events at Weirton Steel Company in 1984 preceding the 
formation of one of the best known ESOPs in the United States. 
The saga of employee ownership at Weirton Steel began as one of “forced ownership.”
113 
 Either the operations would be restructured and refinanced under employee ownership or they 
would be closed.
114  As one worker explained the choices employees had, it was either “buy it or 
                                                 
108  Id. at 73-77. 
109  Id. at 139. 
110  See Milica Uvalic & Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, Introduction: Creating 
Employee Capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe, in Privitization SURPRISES IN 
TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 10-12 (Milica Uvalic & Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead eds. 1997) 
(listing employee ownership legislation in Central and Eastern European countries) 
111  See id. at 1-44 (providing an overview of employee ownership in Central and 
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112  Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the State in Corporate Governance?  
Securitization of State-Owned Enterprises and New Forms of State Ownership, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 57 n.22 (1995); James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance and 
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lose it.”
115  While technically the workers had the right to reject the ESOP, they had little 
bargaining power.  Thus, the eighty-nine percent employee vote in favor of the restructuring 
package, including the ESOP,
116 did not evidence strong worker sentiment in favor of entry into 
employee ownership.  It reflected the desire of a shocked and desperate community to preserve 
its livelihood.  If, as posited earlier,
117 entry and exit rights matter for employee voice, the 
Weirton employees had no real choice with respect to entry.  Once the ESOP was established, 
the  ESOP significantly limited exit rights.
118 
The terms of the Weirton Steel ESOP drastically limited employee participation in 
significant corporate decision making.  Employees were precluded from participating in the 
selection of board members for the first five years of the ESOP’s existence.  Even after five 
years, the ESOP terms required the majority of the Board be comprised of independent 
directors.
119  Thus, in terms of the components of employee ownership discussed earlier as being 
likely to affect employee voice, the Weirton ESOP ranked very low in the level of governance 
rights enjoyed by employee owners. 
Five years after instituting the ESOP, the employees gained voting rights.  At the time, 
Weirton Steel was profitable and making profit-sharing payments.  But, the company needed to 
make a substantial investment in equipment and capital improvements.  The employee-owners  
had not been willing to forgo profit sharing payments in order to fund those improvements.  
                                                 
115  Id. at 81. 
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When first confronted with a proposal to undertake a public stock offering, which would have 
diluted their ownership, employees reacted vociferously against the proposal.  The Board 
withdrew that proposal two days prior to the scheduled shareholder vote.
120  Ultimately, though, 
the employees approved a plan under which they retained majority ownership and the right for 
the ESOP to select a director to represent its interests.
121 
Turning to the third component of employee ownership, the initial restructuring of 
Weirton Steel in 1984 did include substantial employee participation programs, including the 
establishment of voluntary Employee Participation Groups (EPGs), that technically were 
unrelated to the ESOP.
122  The company provided EPGs with initial training on the concept and 
implementation of participation, paid overtime rates for meeting times, and assigned professional 
facilitators to assist the EPGs.
123  Yet, after three years, even liberal estimates indicated that only 
about fourteen percent of the employees participated in EPGs.
124  In his extensive, on-site 
research at Weirton Steel, Varano documented significant levels of management hostility toward 
EPGs and rejections, without any logical basis, of EPG proposals.
125  He also observed problems 
with EPGs that wanted to address issues in areas that were reserved to management decision-
making or to union bargaining.
126  In Professor Varano’s view: “For workers EPG led to 
                                                 
120  Id. at 303-07. 
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frustration and criticism expressed in moral terms and that drew from a normative order that was 
regularly evoked alongside their moderate expectations of the participation reforms.”
127  He 
believes that EPG institutionalized class divisions and structure at Weirton Steel.
128  By failing to 
change the real allocation of power between management and employees, EPG failed to create 
any “identity of interests.”
129  By late September 1996, no more than sixty-five employees 
remained active in EPGs.
130 
On the other hand, Weirton Steel calculated that EPGs saved it “an equivalency of $330 
million in sales” in 1986.
131  Though it may have been a small percentage of the total workforce, 
approximately twelve hundred employees did participate in EPGs in 1986.
132  And, by 1988, at 
least two thousand employees had participated in EPG training.
133  Perhaps, at least during the 
early years of the ESOP, EPGs provided some mechanism for employees to explore their rights 
to voice. 
Varano’s study of the Weirton community surfaced controversies and confusion within 
the community that he believed were associated with employee ownership.  In Varano’s words, 
“events and company policies undermined local customs and normative codes that people relied 
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on in constructing a meaningful and morally relevant view of worker ownership.
134  Once the 
mill became employee owned, the community blamed mill workers for being overpaid and 
inefficient.
135  The community and workers alike struggled with the compensation levels of 
management.
136   Varano concluded that: “Four years after ESOP both the basis of leadership as 
well as its monetary value were being seriously questioned as class divisions became more 
transparent.”
137  The stresses of struggling – as owners, as employees, and as a community – 
with a financially unsound business debilitated the complex web of community reliance that had 
developed during lucrative and paternalistic times. 
Employee ownership cannot bear sole responsibility for Weirton Steel’s struggles.  The 
entire U.S. steel industry has been under intense pressure from international competition, 
changing demand, and aging industrial facilities.
138  Varano’s lens on the conflicts that 
developed among workers, management, and the Weirton community, however, focuses on the 
role of employee ownership during one situation of economic and cultural transition.  As such, 
Varano’s concerns may be relevant in evaluating whether employee ownership and participation 
can enhance employee voice and the subsequent question of whether employee voice can make a 
positive contribution to corporate governance, business ethics, and peace. 
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IV.  Conceptual Connections – Employee Ownership and Participation, Corporate 
Governance, Business Ethics, and Sustainable Peace 
 
 
In this Part, I embark on an initial conceptual inquiry into the possible connections 
among employee ownership and participation programs, corporate governance, business ethics 
and sustainable peace.   I begin in the first subsection by considering whether employee 
ownership and participation might be useful in monitoring corporate management and 
encouraging practices that support sustainable peace.  In the next section, I consider a more 
general variant of that question.  Might employee ownership and participation affect the extent to 
which corporations model democratic principles?  Finally, in the last section I explore whether 
employee ownership and participation could lead to reductions in what commentators identify as 
“sources of conflict.”
139 
 
A.   Monitoring Managerial Choices 
 
Some participants in the 2001 Peace Symposium considered ways in which managerial 
choices might affect the environment for sustainable peace.  Professor Nesteruk argued that a 
conception of the firm as property, with all implicit loyalties being directed to the equity 
shareholders, may lead to a “diminished form of community”
140  His analysis seems to imply that 
a communitarian notion of the corporation may be more compatible with the underlying factors 
                                                 
139  Fort & Schipani, supra note 15, at 390, 416. 
140 Nesteruk,  supra note 14, at 449. William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
  38
thought to support peaceful societies.
141  Professor Tavis contended that, in spite of some 
economic arguments to the contrary, managers have room to exercise discretion in their 
decision-making.
142  He also observed that, in some contexts, corporations are displacing 
governments as the relevant actors in situations where governments have historically taken the 
lead.
143  The question I raise, without presuming to answer it in this initial inquiry, is whether 
employee ownership and participation might enhance monitoring of managerial decision making 
in ways, that, at least indirectly, promote peacefulness or discourage conflict. 
 
1.  Firm Level Challenges 
 
Employee ownership and participation might have implications for employee voice on 
four firm level challenges identified as being relevant to peace dynamics.  The first challenge is 
the need to monitor management for activities of self-interest in modern corporations, which so 
frequently bifurcate ownership and control.  Second, if one accepts the nexus-of-contracts model 
of the corporation, is it possible that employee ownership might mitigate the otherwise 
unidimensional profit focus?  Third, assuming a stakeholder model of the corporation, might 
employee ownership and participation ensure that at least some non-shareholder constituencies 
receive reasonable consideration?  Finally, to the extent corporations are assuming some roles 
previously played by governments, do employees have a special competence and interest in 
monitoring managerial decision-making? 
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Respected commentators from Berle and Means
144 in the 1930s, to Orts
145 in recent years, 
have observed the challenges posed by the bifurcation of ownership and management in modern 
corporations.  Management’s self-interest conflicts with shareholder interests, or potentially with 
other stakeholder interests, in such basic areas as the amount of management compensation, job 
retention, and work effort.  Orts effectively captures these conflicts with the evocative phrase 
“shirking and sharking.”
146  The concerns of management self-interest exist whether one views 
the firm as a nexus of contracts or believes it owes obligations to a broader array of stakeholders. 
 The key difference is whether management’s interests conflict only with shareholders or with an 
array of stakeholders. 
The nexus of contracts model of corporations poses a particular risk for peacefulness, 
though, according to commentators such as Nesteruk, because it requires management to work 
solely toward profit-enhancement.  Arguably, this laser-like focus on profits may lead to 
decisions that increase shareholder returns while impinging upon basic human rights,
147 
derogating the environment,
148 or engaging in bribery to acquire contracts or otherwise facilitate 
the corporation’s business.
149  The result may be to increase resentment toward multinational 
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corporations, lock people into unhealthy environments incapable of providing the clean air, 
potable water, and food necessary for life, or contribute to corruption at local levels. 
Even the stakeholder theory of corporations brings with it difficulties and risks for 
sustainable peace.  Modern corporations interface with and affect countless categories of people 
and institutions.  The interactions, as multinational corporations touch, or tread upon, as the case 
may be, local populations serve as one connection between those corporations and societies.  The 
diversity of a multinational corporation’s constituencies almost ensures that taking the needs, 
wants, and views of those constituencies into account in corporate decision-making will not be a 
simple process.  A number of commentators have discussed the difficulties inherent in this 
process, including the potential for direct conflicts in the interest of various constituent 
groups.
150 
Peace commentators have observed that multinationals increasingly stand in roles 
formerly held by governments.
151  As an example, Tavis reports that twelve multinational 
entities were successful in developing intellectual property regulation.
152  As managers of 
multinationals take on roles similar to those held by public officials, then it becomes logical to 
inquire whether the existing checks on managerial authority remain sufficient.  Tavis observes 
that the marketplace serves as one constraint on the actions of multinational corporations in these 
situations.
153  It seems fair to question whether the democratic principles of transparency, 
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representation, and accountability to those governed also may have increasing relevance in the 
monitoring of corporations as multinationals exercise new types of power. 
 
2.  Employees as Effective Monitors 
 
Given a need for monitoring of corporate management, employee ownership and 
participation programs provide one basis from which employees may exercise voice to serve as 
monitors of corporate management.  Employees may be particularly effective in monitoring 
managerial self interest in both the shirking and the sharking senses.
154  At least when viewed 
collectively, one would expect the employee population to be familiar with the company’s 
business and its competitors, as well as the day-to-day roles, activities, and commitments 
evidenced by management.  As Gordon puts this: “Employees are often in a good position – 
much better than public shareholders – to evaluate the exercise of managerial authority within 
the firm.... [and may be] especially well suited for assignments such as the compensation 
committee...”
155   
Although organizational complexity and individual specialization may make it 
increasingly difficult, day-to-day presence and knowledge of the firm may enable employees to 
identify more overt corruption and unethical activity.
156  As Dworkin observes: “corruption and 
unethical practices in the workplace are . . . thought to result in declining confidence in major 
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institutions and to contribute to the alienation and anomie experienced in modern society.”
157  In 
a somewhat similar vein, Fort and Schipani identified a potential link between corruption and 
violence.
158  Ownership interests may increase the financial or moral incentives for employees to 
root out and report corporate wrongdoing before it drains the business of assets or causes a 
negative reputational effect that affects the stock price.  The work of Dworkin and Fort and 
Schipani implies this may be a small but valuable contribution.  
Gordon does not explain why he singles out the compensation committee as an especially 
appropriate forum for employee involvement.  Perhaps he believes that employees are uniquely 
situated to measure the long and short term contributions of managers.  In addition to their 
presence in the workplace and familiarity with the corporation, employees tend to have long 
term interests in their employer.  Their jobs, their pension, any other deferred compensation, and 
for at least some employees, their own professional reputations may be tied to the long term 
success of the firm. 
159 
Employees may be effective monitors of management, however, even in the absence of 
the types of ownership and participation considered in this article.  A strong union might obtain 
the necessary information, provide employees with voice and protection, and gather sufficient 
collective power to enable monitoring.  Or, in the Western European system, the concepts of 
information and consultation,
160 may enable monitoring.  
The question, though, is not whether employee ownership and participation is the sole 
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route to employee monitoring.  It, instead, is whether employee ownership and participation can 
contribute to successful monitoring.  And, arguably at least, by increasing employees’ financial 
stake in the corporate enterprise, these programs may further focus employee attention on 
monitoring opportunities.  As financial participants, whether through ownership or profit sharing 
programs, employees may have a greater interest in preventing shirking and sharking than that 
established by their role as employees.  Furthermore, a significant ownership stake or extensive 
participation program may give employees voice and power to ensure that management does not 
ignore employee views.  To achieve this effect, though, may require both the type of significant 
ownership levels that typically only occur through ESOPs or vouchers and limitations on entry 
and exit rights.   
If corporations are viewed as a nexus of contracts, employee ownership
161 might 
significantly change the company’s decision-making dynamics.  Even in maximizing shareholder 
value, Tavis argues that managers have significant discretion in making decisions that affect the 
corporation and its role in the communities where it operates.
162  For example, how do managers 
establish the balance between long term and short term value?  If two alternative projects have 
the same net present value, how do managers choose between them?     
  As shareholders, employees can exercise the traditional power of shareholders to convey 
their views on these issues.
163  Their perspective as employees may enrich the analysis 
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shareholders typically bring to these issues.  For example, their other long-term connections with 
the corporation,
164 may lead employee shareholders to emphasize the long term.  Or, their 
experience as employees by day and as members of the communities where the corporation has 
operations
165 might lead employees to judge management’s actions according to a larger societal 
view than might be held by a classic institutional shareholder. 
Turning to the constituency model of the corporation, employee ownership and 
participation may have a role in resolving conflicts among constituencies.  The richness of the 
employee perspective, as long term employee stakeholders, citizens of the firm’s communities, 
and as actors who are familiar with the firm’s operations and challenges, may enable them to 
evaluate and balance competing pressures.  Even the more implicit factors, such as the nexuses 
discussed by Tavis and Melé,
166 that bind the constituencies may find their way into 
management decision-making through the exercise of voice by employee stakeholders. 
The constituency models call for corporations to take the employee group into account in 
decision making as one of the corporation’s significant constituencies.
167  Arguably, then, 
employee ownership is not necessary in order to ensure that management include employee 
voice as a decision-making factor.  However, ownership and financial participation increases 
employees’ stake in the firm.  That increased stake may encourage the employee constituency to 
develop and voice its perspective.  For example, the extensive use of profit sharing programs in 
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France may encourage employee voice because higher profit levels should translate into higher 
levels of total compensation for employees.  Thus, employee ownership and participation 
programs may have some role in addressing Tavis’ concern
168 that weak stakeholders need 
protection from strong ones.  The most obvious implication is that if employees would constitute 
a weak cohort without ownership, ownership may increase the cohort’s relative power.  More 
subtly, if employees also represent the interests of the communities where they live or otherwise 
bring a diversity of perspectives, then empowering the employee cohort through ownership or 
participation also may indirectly enhance other stakeholder interests. 
Finally, employees may serve as important monitors as corporations take over roles 
formerly assumed by governments.  Fort and Schipani observed a link between democratic 
principles and peaceful societies.
169  The potential benefits of employee ownership and 
participation parallel the advantages in the context of the nexus of contract and constituency 
models of corporations.  Employee ownership and participation may serve as a check in a 
checks-and-balances system to protect against misuse of corporate power.  It may incent 
employees to take interest in corporate decision-making.  It may enrich the perspective of 
employees.  And, it may help ensure that corporate decision makers do not disregard employee 
voice. 
 
3.  “Workers by Day”
170 
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Employee ownership and participation may bring with it its own set of challenges for a 
corporation.  Varano has observed that these programs may lead to structural conflicts of 
interest.
171  In part, this concern is evidenced through view that:  “You can’t confuse ownership 
and being an employee.  At home, a shareholder.  At work an employee.”
172  An inherent tension 
exists in expecting employees to monitor firm management at the same time that management is 
supervising employees.  Yet asking employees to leave their ownership interest at home both 
forfeits some of the advantages of employee ownership and imposes a sort of schizophrenic 
existence upon employees. 
Even commentators such as Gordon, who I quote above on the unique role employees 
may plan in monitoring management particularly on compensation issues,
173 are not entirely 
consistent in their support of employee monitoring.  In the same article where he suggests that 
employees may serve as efficient monitors of executive compensation, Gordon discusses the 
United Airlines Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (UAL ESOP).
174   He notes, with seeming 
favor, that “The sensitive matter of compensation of senior management [at UAL] is addressed 
by a complicated committee structure.”
175  The implicit concern seems to be that employees may 
be unable to rationally address the need to pay market rates of executive compensation and 
structure appropriate incentives for top management. 
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Varano raises similar questions about employee attitudes toward other strategic and 
financial decisions as a result of his study of Weirton Steel.  He notes that employees may have a 
preference for current profit-sharing over long term investment.
176 Employees may fight public 
stock sales that dilute their ownership interest and rights
177 even if the sales are the best avenue 
for financial restructuring, funding capital projects, or other important corporate purposes. 
There also is a danger that by aligning employees’ financial incentives with those of 
equity shareholders, ownership and financial participation programs could actually increase 
problematic corporate behavior.  Ownership and financial participation programs, such as the 
profit sharing programs common in France, may incent employees to support management in 
seeking higher levels of profit without regard to the social, environmental, or conflict 
ramifications.  Or, the employees themselves may take actions to enhance profits but that 
impinge on communities in negative ways.  If so, then the ownership and financial participation 
programs may negate, or even reverse, the positive role that advocates of a stakeholder approach 
to corporate theory expect employees to serve.   
In sum, commentators at the 2001 Peace Symposium identified ways in which traditional 
corporate law theories of management self-interest, theories of the firm, and the changing role of 
multinational corporations may have connections with peaceful societies.  In this subsection I 
have identified some ways in which employee ownership and control may play a role in 
addressing the concerns of these commentators.  Even without ownership and participation 
programs, employees may serve as a moderating influence on some of the concerns and there 
may be other approaches beyond the programs I discuss here that empower employees.   
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At least in some situations, though, employee ownership and participation programs may 
increase the incentives for employees to actively monitor management.  These program also may 
enrich employee perspectives.  They may help ensure that management does not disregard 
employee voice.  Legitimate questions remain, however, on whether employee ownership and 
participation programs may pose challenges for corporations that utilize those programs, 
primarily because of structural conflicts of interest that exist when the roles of employee and 
owner intersect. 
 
B.  Modeling Democratic Principles 
 
At the 2001 Peace Symposium, Fort & Schipani observed that a society’s level of 
peacefulness may be positively correlated with the use of democratic governing principles.
178  
Taking this observation one more step, multinational corporations can choose to act in ways that 
model democracy for their employees and the broader communities in which they are active.
179  
As Tavis puts it: “Through an ethos of participation and empowerment, multinationals can also 
contribute to democratization.”
180  It is useful, then to consider whether employee ownership and 
participation programs may contribute to the development of democratic principles within a 
corporation. 
 
1.  Effect of Employee Ownership and Participation 
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Multinational corporations may utilize employee ownership and participation programs 
as one tool among many to bring democratic ideals to the workplace.  Here I will discuss three 
ways in which these programs may reinforce ideals of self-governance and support employee 
voice.  Commentators have identified each of these ideals as being important to the connection 
between democratic principles and peacefulness. 
First, employee ownership and participation programs may be ways in which 
multinationals can enable employees in the use of basic voting rights.  Formal ownership may 
provide employees a role in the election of directors, or the right to vote in certain corporate 
transactions.   In these ways ownership and participation programs establish opportunities for 
employees to utilize voting skills that are important for members of a functioning democracy.  
The power of a single or small number of votes or voice may be negligible, but that too mirrors 
the nature of democratic governments. 
Second, implicit factors of employee ownership and participation programs may have an 
effect on employees and their attitudes toward conflict resolution.  Tavis observes that 
democracies can be characterized in a narrow sense as those governmental units that hold free 
elections.
181  A more nuanced definition, however, looks to:  “Different conceptual, less 
measurable components”
182 though such definitions also “engender[ ] substantial 
disagreement.”
183  Components in such a definition of democracy might include political 
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participation, mechanisms to enhance voice, and increased decision-marking transparency.
184  
Dworkin also appears to support a nuanced view of democracy.  She observes that a whistle-
blowing program “gives individuals a say in their organization, and contributes to a feeling of 
procedural justice.  Giving individuals a standardized way to speak and be heard also helps 
reinforce democratic ideas.”
185  Thus, by taking a broad view it is possible to identify a variety of 
components of democratic institutions. 
Employee ownership and participation programs may enable employees to experience 
and develop skills with these components of democracy.  For example, the programs have some 
parallels with whistle-blowing programs as tools of good governance.  As discussed earlier,
186 
employee ownership and participation programs can enable and encourage employee voice.  By 
encouraging employee monitoring they can increase management accountability. 
187  Ownership 
and participation programs can provide procedural mechanisms through which employees can 
provide input.     
Third, programs to enable employees as owners and participants in the governance of 
 their employer may further equality norms.  Tavis believes that economic inequality
188 
challenges democracy.  In Varano’s study of the Weirton Steel ESOP, he observed that rank and 
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file employees shared “class interests and community norms.”
189  He argues that these shared 
interests led workers to pursue equality in pay systems such as profit sharing as well as 
collective interests such as job security.
190  Even an employer’s choice of an ownership program 
can model equality principles.  For example, employee stock purchase plans typically are open to 
a wider array of workers than are stock option plans.  But, because participation depends on an 
employee’s willingness to participate and ability to afford the purchase of stock, equality of 
access may be quite superficial.  An ESOP or voucher program, in contrast may result in a much 
higher percentage of employees holding ownership interests. 
 
2.  Possible Irrelevance of Employee Voice 
 
One question that requires further thought in this context is the extent to which workplace 
governance parallels societal governance.  If significant differences exist, then corporations may 
face challenges in modeling democratic principles for external communities.  In this regard, 
Logue argues that: “Economic democracy differs significantly from political democracy.  It is 
shaped by the unforgiving nature of the market economy.”
191 
More specifically, Logue lists five ways in which democracy within corporations differs 
from political democracy.  First, not all votes and opinions are equal in a corporation.
192  In part, 
though, this seems to recognize the limited use of democracy by some corporations rather than 
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being an inherent difference between corporations and political entities.  Further, one might ask 
whether all opinions are truly equal in political democracy, or whether some people are more 
persuasive because of their wealth, family connections, education, or more undefined 
characteristics such as charisma.  Second, Logue argues that consensus is necessary in a 
corporation.
193  Some level of consensus, however, is necessary for a functioning democracy.  
And, corporations do tolerate some level of challenge. In fact, commentators now argue that 
encouraging dissent within a corporation is important to ensuring good governance,
194 and at 
least a few corporations seem to be walking the talk.
195   
Third, Logue says that it is easy to vote with one’s feet in a corporation.
196  This often is 
not true for rank-and-file workers, however, who may be locked into their current employment 
situation or at least their geographic area due to family, educational, property, or cultural factors. 
 Fourth, Logue asserts that a corporation’s purpose is defined by the competitive market whereas 
governmental democracies have more flexibility in defining their goals.
197  Certainly Logue is 
correct that corporations must remain economically viable to survive.  But, the same is true of 
governmental entities.  And, Tavis argues convincingly that even within economic constraints, 
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corporate managers have some flexibility in decision-making.
198  Finally, Logue believes that 
members of companies are better informed than citizens of democracies.  He cites no data to 
support this assertion.  One would think that information levels would depend on many factors 
such as transparency, education, and incentives to become informed. 
Though Logue is not entirely convincing in the specific arguments he makes, it certainly 
is possible to think that corporate democracy may differ inherently from political democracy.  
Or, corporations might purport to utilize ownership and participation programs in ways that 
promote worker democratic involvement but, in fact, sponsor programs that permit workers to 
exercise voice in only limited or illusory ways.  In such an instance, the corporations may poison 
workers’ views of democracy.  Varano observes that worker ownership may “ignore[ ] workers 
as producers and minimize[ ] or exclude[ ] any inclinations they have toward control.  Indirectly, 
it seeks to manage such inclinations by structuring another financial stake for workers beyond 
their wages in exchange for obedience and discipline.”
199  In fact, it appears that workers at 
Weirton Steel became frustrated with their lack of voting rights,
200 inability to influence 
compensation decisions,
201 and management’s failure to act in response to recommendations of 
the participation program groups.
202 
One view of the positive role employee ownership and participation might play is in 
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strengthening implicit democratic norms of voice, dispute resolution, and procedural justice.
203  
In practice, however, the extent to which employee ownership can effectively change a 
corporation’s internal culture remains unclear.  One current example helps to illustrate the 
difficulties even majority ownership programs, such as an ESOP, face when confronted with an 
entrenched culture of internal animosity.  In 1994, an ESOP took control of more than fifty 
percent of UAL.
204  At a time of significant economic pressure, pilots and mechanics agreed to 
an estimated $4.9 billion in wage reductions and work rule changes in exchange for the ESOP 
arrangements.
205  UAL arbitrarily included non union employees in the ESOP.
206  In contrast, the 
flight attendants, through their union, declined to participate.
207 
Initially it appeared that the employees who participated in the ESOP made a terrific 
financial decision.
208  Over the longer term, however, the ESOP did not solve the cultural 
problems at UAL.  The UAL ESOP has been criticized as a “concept [that] was flawed from 
take-off.  The unions, especially the pilots union, soon realized that they could extract more 
wealth from United by driving up salaries than by growing the stock.”
209   The participation of 
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some, but not all, unions stressed relations among the unions.
210 
After UAL announced its interest in acquiring US Airways, the pilot’s ESOP ownership 
did not discourage the pilots from imposing substantial business costs on UAL in summer 
2000.
211  Pilots’ refusal to work overtime caused tens of thousands of flights to be cancelled.
212  
Most recently, in its struggle to obtain government loans to avert bankruptcy in the wake of the 
effect of 9-11 on the entire airline industry, UAL struggled to obtain concessions from its 
unions.
213  Even Rosen, a strong advocate of employee ownership and the executive director and 
co-founder of the National Center for Employee Ownership has said that “giving stock to 
employees was no cure for the company’s long-embedded labor animosity.”
214 
In sum, employee ownership and participation may be one means corporations can utilize 
to further internal democracy.  To the extent that the programs successfully contribute to such an 
objective they also may provide employees with democratic skills for use outside the workplace. 
 And, workplace democracy may serve as a model for the governance of the external community. 
 However, employee ownership and participation programs will not serve as panaceas.  If 
instituted on a superficial level they may lead to increased tension and frustration in the 
workplace and the community.  Nor will they necessarily resolve long-standing cultural 
problems within a corporation.  Employees who experience the lack of success of superficial or 
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otherwise unsuccessful ownership and public programs might question the value of democratic 
principles within and outside the workplace. 
 
C.  Reducing Conflict through Employee Voice 
 
In the prior two subsections I considered the potential connections between employee 
ownership and participation programs and workplace governance.  In this subpart I turn to 
possible connections between those programs and communities where employees live and work. 
 Of course, both monitoring and the internal operation of democratic principles also have effects 
on the communities where the multinational corporations operate.  Here, though, I will 
concentrate explicitly on the connections with community in the context of employee voice and 
sources of conflict. 
 
1. Employee  Voice 
 
Employees may act as transmitters of norms between their firm and the community.  By 
providing information on local culture, history, and expectations, employees may transmit 
knowledge to the company that helps it avoid creating friction.  For example, when a 
multinational corporation establishes operations in a new location, employees may explain subtle 
religious practices to foreign managers as the employees voice their expectations of the 
workplace.  Sensitized managers may consider those practices as they develop the corporation’s 
local strategies and engage with the local community.  Likewise, as ambassadors for the 
company to the community, employees can increase the transparency of the company’s culture William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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and intended community role. 
As with most employee roles discussed in this article, employees could fulfill these 
functions in the absence of employee ownership and participation programs.  Financial 
participation, however, may increase employees’ incentives to exercise voice to avoid disputes 
or to address them in productive ways.  It also may encourage employees to act as mediators, 
instead of standing apart, if misunderstandings occur.  Here, localized programs may be 
important in order that employees can see effects from their own actions on their financial 
participation interests.  A company-wide ESOP sponsored by a large multinational corporation 
may result in such small ownership interests for employees at a small outpost that the potential 
incentive effects of ownership are negated. 
Similarly, decision-making participation can help provide formal avenues for employee 
voice.  It also can discourage management from ignoring employee voice.  A formalized 
program could be especially important in cultures where individuals do not have societal 
experience in effective use of voice.  But, again, it seems reasonable to expect that a decision-
making program may have to be localized in order to develop participation skills and provide a 
mechanism where workers can see an effect from the exercise of voice. 
2.  “Sources of Conflict”
215  
 
The ideal way to combat conflict may be to eliminate the root cause of conflict.  
Commentators have identified a variety of fundamental societal problems that may lead to 
conflict.  Fort and Schipani discuss needs theory and security, as well as the connections 
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between these theories and ethics theory as ways of identifying conditions that lead to conflict.
216 
   In a similar vein Tavis discusses a “global social void of inequality and insecurity.”
217  At the 
center of this void, created by globalization and technology, lie human rights violations.  Other 
manifestations include inequality in wealth distribution, economic instability, and opportunity 
for human development.  Tavis’ consideration of human development draws heavily on the work 
of Amata Sen.  Tavis characterizes Sen’s five instrumental freedoms – political freedom, 
economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security – as 
sharing the common traits of economic accomplishment and participation.
218   
Employee ownership and participation programs might increase access to these 
instrumental freedoms in two ways.  First, the programs may directly affect the economic 
opportunity and participation rights of the employees who are program members.
219  Because 
those employees are community members, the programs will affect community wealth quite 
directly.   As members of the community, employees’ nonworkplace application of decision 
making and participation skills may directly impact the way the community makes decisions and 
resolves conflicts.  
Second, workplace ownership and participation programs may have an indirect effect on 
community members who are not employees.  As employees spend enhanced income, or even as 
they enjoy the wealth effect of inaccessible assets, the greater community takes part in economic 
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accomplishment.  Similarly, as employees learn democratic skills, principled decision making, 
and ability to develop consensus in the workplace, those skills may spread to the community 
through interactions with family, social, religious, political, or other cohort groups. 
 
3.  The Cost of Superficial Programs 
 
Communities may hold employees accountable for the perceived effects corporations 
have on communities, whether or not employees have a role in the relevant decision making.  
Superficial employee ownership and participation programs may enhance this designation of 
responsibility by causing communities to believe employees have substantially more power and 
voice within the corporation than employees are able to exercise.  Employee ownership and 
participation programs in these cases may give rise to a worst case scenario.  Communities 
expect more of their members who are employees than those members can possibly achieve in 
representing local interests within the firm.  The end result may be to create of conflict between 
community members who are not employees and those who are.  In such an instance, the 
ownership and participation program would have increased the level of conflict in the local 
community. 
Weirton Steel provides a slightly different example, where internal corporate struggles 
spilled over into the community.  The Weirton community has struggled to rationalize the class 
conflicts that developed during the initial stages of the ESOP.
220  The long history of localism in 
Weirton arguable motivated the continuing employee compromises that led to the mill’s, and 
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perhaps the town’s, survival.
221 
Tavis places significance on the roles of economic accomplishment and participation in 
eliminating sources of conflict.
222  Looking first at economic accomplishment, employee 
ownership and participation programs are not unerring vehicles in the quest for economic 
enhancement and true exercise of employee voice.  Financial participation and ownership can 
concentrate an employee’s already significant job-related risk.  These programs can result in 
situations where employees lose savings and expected deferred compensation, in addition to 
losing their jobs.  The programs in Egypt may have this effect since they are so heavily 
concentrated in companies that could not obtain financing from market sources.
223  Even where 
losses are due to legitimate business circumstance, and not to management greed or outright 
fraud, the concentration of losses may be devastating to the employee population.  This would 
have a concomitant effect on the local community, increasing the threat to economic 
accomplishment that Tavis and Sen view as critical to instrumental freedoms. 
Workplace participation programs may or may not result in true participation of the type 
Tavis has in mind.  Superficial quality circle programs may not increase firm transparency in any 
significant way.  Nor by creating a mechanism for employee voice does it necessarily follow that 
employees will be free to voice dissenting opinions or engage management in dialogue.  Varano 
argues that the EPS program at Weirton Steel led to frustration because management so 
frequently ignored workers’ suggestions.  One also might wonder whether the voting rights 
Russian employees received as part of privatization programs have had any effect at increasing 
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participation or even relevant voting skills since many employees allegedly have transferred their 
voting rights to management or been commanded how to vote. 
In sum, it seems reasonable to theorize that the overall effect of employee ownership and 
participation programs in the communities that encompass the employees probably depends on 
the nature of the programs, the firm, and the community.  In this article I have suggested some 
possible ways in which these programs might have a direct positive effect on the communities.  
Future research could seek to define the characteristics of programs that would be most likely to 
support employee voice, increase economic accomplishment, and enhance participation. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion  
 
 
In this article I concentrated on identifying how the use of employee ownership and 
participation plans may connect with the principles identified by the participants in the 2001 
Peace Symposium as being important in enhancing the opportunity for sustainable peace.  
Particularly in periods following economic crisis or major conflict, commentators have looked to 
employee ownership and participation programs as mechanisms to address the underlying 
sources of crisis.  Whether for economic or social purposes, or both, countries throughout the 
world have established legislative frameworks to encourage and support employee ownership 
and participation programs.  The scope and variation of programs used by corporations 
throughout the world can be unpacked into three basic dimensions: financial participation rights, 
decision-making participation rights, and entry and exit rights. 
Theoretically programs which accord employees status as owner-participants link with 
the principles identified in the 2001 Peace Symposium as connecting corporate governance, 
business ethics & peace.  Employees acting as owner-participants may serve important corporate William Davison Institute Working Paper 531 
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governance functions.  As monitors of management, employees may root out corruption.  They 
also may ensure multinational corporations consider the perspectives of employees and their 
communities in corporate decision making.  In their roles as owner-participants, employees may 
learn important skills for use in developing democracies including the exercise of voting rights, 
conflict resolution, reasoned advocacy, and acceptance of majority determinations.  These 
participation skills and potential economic empowerment may carry over both directly and 
indirectly to the local community. 
But, the various types of programs result in complex relationships among employees who 
are owner-participants, their employers, and their community.  The multiplicity of implications 
from these programs is inconsistent with a one-size fits all approach.
224  Much work remains to 
be done to identify and verify the ways in which ownership and participation programs may 
serve different cultural, economic, and industry needs.  There is good reason, however, to 
believe that employee ownership and participation programs can serve as one useful mechanism 
for corporations that seek to enhance employee voice and economic accomplishment. 
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